The determinants of non-audit fees in French firms by Emna Jedidi Hentati & Faouzi Jilani
 *Corresponding author.  
E-mail addresses:  emna77jedidi@yahoo.fr  (E. Jedidi Hentati) 
 
 
© 2013 Growing Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
doi: 10.5267/j.msl.2013.05.004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 1773–1782 
 
 
Contents lists available at GrowingScience
 
Management Science Letters  
 
homepage: www.GrowingScience.com/msl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The determinants of non-audit fees in French firms    
 
 
Emna Jedidi Hentati
a* and Faouzi Jilani
b 
  
 
 
 
 
aDoctorate in Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management of Sfax, Tunisia 
bProfessor in Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management of Tunis, Campus Universitaire-Tunis, Tunisia 
C H R O N I C L E                                 A B S T R A C T 
Article history:  
Received  January 18, 2013 
Received in revised format  
28 April 2013  
Accepted 1 May  2013 
Available online  
May 1 2013 
  This study analyzes the determinants of non audit-fees for a sample of 67 French companies 
belonging to the SBF 120 index during the period 2005-2007. Our attention focused on the 
influence of shareholder / creditor agency costs - namely debts and investment opportunities. 
Based on panel regression methodology, our results reveal that the affiliation of the auditor to 
an international network, the presence of an audit committee, the debt, the size of the company 
and the closing date have an effect on non-audit fees. However, investment opportunities do not 
affect the amount of non-audit fees.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, corporate scandals have been multiplied and have shaken the business world (Enron 
and WorldCom in the United States, OneTel in Australia, Parmalat in Italy, Vivendi in France, etc.). 
Following these scandals, the realization of non-audit services by audit firms has led to an important 
academic literature. Indeed, the Commission of Financial Market Operations (COB) introduced in 
2002 an obligation requiring the disclosure of the amounts of the auditing fees in all documents and / 
or prospectus filed or registered from 1st January 2003. The Financial Security Law (LSF) required 
that all companies make information about the amount of each auditor fees available for stockholders. 
Besides, the European Directive 2006/43/EC requested the disclosure of the amounts of fees in 
appendices of the social and consolidated statements. 
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The main objective of these measures is to give investors an overview of the importance of the 
relationship between the company and its auditors. Indeed, legislators have found that non-audit 
services put into question the auditors’ independence. 
 
The publication of audit and non-audit fees can provide information about the nature of the 
relationship between auditor and audited firms as well as auditor’s independence. Thus, the level of 
non-audit fees becomes an indicator of the degree of independence of auditors. In this regard, 
auditors, to signal their independence, choose to reduce consulting services conducted with customers 
for whom they are already in charge of audit services. On the other side, companies may report a 
higher quality of their financial information by choosing not to use the non-audit services, signalling 
therefore the independence of their auditors.  
 
Several researchers (Frankel et al., 2002; DeFond et al. 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004; Hay et al., 2006 
Ruddock et al., 2006) have benefited from the availability of the amounts of audit fees to study the 
potential impact of non-audit services on auditors’ independence. However, few studies (Lemaux, 
2007) have examined the impact of non-audit fees on the financial performance of the audited 
company. 
 
In this paper, we will carry out a study of the determinants of non-audit fees to test the hypothesis of a 
relationship between the financial performance of the audited company and the amount of non-audit 
fees paid. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized in 4 sections. The first presents an overview of the academic 
literature on non-audit fees and outlines the hypothesis. The second exposes the research 
methodology. The third section presents a discussion of our results. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis 
 
The literature on the non-audit fees can be divided on three views. The first one examined the impact 
of non-audit fees on the added value especially on discretionary accruals (Francis & Ke, 2003; 
Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Reynolds et al., 2004; Lim & Tan, 2008), on the 
propensity to issue notices of the continuity (Defond et al., 2002), on the conservatism gains 
(Ruddock et al., 2005), on the real bonds’ estimates (Brandon et al., 2004), on response benefit 
coefficients (Francis & Ke, 2006) and on the cases of earnings restatements (Kinney et al., 2004), 
Bloomfield and Shackman (2008). For the most of these studies, the results suggest that non-audit 
fees appear to have a negative effect on the audit quality (Defond & Francis, 2005). 
 
The second view analyzed the effect of non-audit fees on the auditor’s independence. Mautz and 
Sharaf (1961) were the first to study this question. Then, many other authors (DeAngelo, 1981; Beck 
et al., 1988a, 1988b; Magee & Tseng, 1990) show that consulting fees reduce auditors’ independence. 
Simunic (1984) and Beck et al. (1988a) find that when the same auditor provides audit and consulting 
services, it can’t be totally independent. Brandon et al. (2004) discuss the effects of the amount of 
consulting fees on the auditors’ independence imposed by bond market. Her results show that the 
amount of consulting fees is negatively associated with bond ratings. Firth (2002) find that the 
provision of "Management Advisory Services" MAS, allows the auditor to acquire a specific skill 
leading to a higher audit quality. 
 
The third view concentrated on the factors which can explain the non-audit fees. The first factor is the 
presence of a BIG. While Simunic (1980) and Francis (1984) show that BIG 5 has significantly 
higher fees than other firms, Francis and Stokes (1986), Simon (1985), Palmrose (1986) and Che-
Ahmad Houghton (1996) find opposite results. So, our first hypothesis can be the following:  
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Hypothesis 1: The presence of a big has an impact on non-audit fees. 
 
The presence of an audit committee can also have an effect on non audit fees. (Eichenseher et al., 
1989) find that the financial market reacts more favourably when a company uses a large audit firm. 
It also appears that the major audit networks often issue reserves more often than smaller audit firms. 
As a result, Francis and Wilson (1988), Johnson and Lys (1990) and Firth and Smith (1992) show that 
companies undergoing high agency costs have a greater tendency to engage in international audit 
networks. Also, Abbott et al. (2003b) find that the part of consulting fees to total fees decreases in the 
presence of a fully independent audit committee. They conclude that the role of the audit committee 
is to control the independence of the auditor by limiting any other non-audit activities. Thus, our 
second hypothesis can be written as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of an audit committee has a negative impact on non-audit fees. 
 
Another factor mentioned in previous literature is the Debt. Simunic (1980) affirm that the debt 
which is a measure of the risk of bankruptcy of the client, exposes the auditor to financial risk and 
reputation. Under these conditions, auditors may provide non-audit missions to help companies to 
manage their reputation risk. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), facing a high level of debt, 
the company directors encourage their auditors to preserve their accounting image. This should lead 
to an increase in non-audit fees. 
So, our third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The debt ratio has a positive impact on non-audit fees. 
 
Also, investment opportunities can represent another factor that drives non-audit missions by 
auditors. Indeed, consulting outside the company can be seen as a way to detect opportunities. In this 
case, non-audit fees can increase when investment opportunities arise. Thus, our fouth hypothesis can 
be written as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The investment opportunities have a positive impact on non-audit fees. 
 
The size of the company is also a potentially important determinant of the choice of the external 
auditor. Most of the empirical studies (Chow, 1982; Copley et al., 1995; Weets, 1999; Abbot & 
Parker, 2000; Piot, 2001a, 2001b; Fan & Wong, 2002a; Niemi & sundgrem, 2003; Hay & Work, 
2004; Lennox, 2004) have shown a positive relationship between this variable and the amount of fees 
paid by the audited firm. We assume that this relationship is also verified for non-audit fees. Thus, 
our fifth hypothesis is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The size of the audited company has a positive impact on non-audit fees. 
 
The closing date is also another determinant of non-audit fees. In fact, the audit activity is not linear 
and stable during the financial year. There is a high concentration of the activity in the first quarter of 
the calendar year, period of closure of the accounts of the majority of listed companies. In this 
perspective, a closing date of accounts at December 31 is a sensitive period for auditors where the 
demand for auditing increases. So, non-audit fees increase. Thus, our sixth hypothesis can be the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 6: A closing date equal to 31 December has a positive impact on non-audit fees. 
 
Apart of the factors indicated, the financial performance can determine non-audit fees. According to 
Tsui et al. (2001) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), leaders of successful companies are more   1776
likely to report the quality of information provided by an external audit which is more rigorous hence 
more expensive. We anticipate a positive relationship between this variable and non-audit fees. Thus, 
our seventh hypothesis is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Financial performance has a positive impact on non-audit fees. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
3.1. The Sample 
 
The empirical study focuses on French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index during the period 
2005-2007. The data were manually collected from annual reports and documents available on the 
websites of the companies concerned. From 2003, the French listed companies are required to 
disclose in their annual reports the amount of fees paid to each of the auditors. We excluded banks, 
insurance and real estate companies because of their particular accounting presentation and their 
specific regulations as well as audit firms for which some data were missing. This selection procedure 
has allowed us to retain 67 companies. 
 
3.2. Definition and measurement of the variables 
 
3.2.1. Non-audit fees  
 
We use the natural logarithm of non-audit fees which include non audit services and other services. 
 
3.2.2. Financial performance of the audited company 
 
We measure the financial performance of the audited company by using the Q of Tobin" which is 
equal to the sum of Total debt and market value per total assets. 
 
3.2.3. International membership of the auditor 
 
The studies of DeAngelo (1981), Piot (2001), Li Dang (2004) and Thoronton et al. (1993) evaluated 
this variable by referring to the quality of the auditor whether or not he belonged to an international 
network (Big eight in the eighties which became Big Four today). For the specific needs of our 
research, we use a dichotomous variable Big / Not Big which takes the value 1 if the firm is audited 
by at least one Big and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2.4. The existence of an Audit Committee 
 
We measure this variable by using a binary variable which takes the value 1 if there is an audit 
Committee and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2.5. The debt ratio 
 
According to previous empirical studies (Francis & Wilson, 1988; Defond, 1992; Firth & Smith,  
1992; Weets, 1999; Abbott & Packer, 2000; Piot, 2001b; Niemi & Sundgren, 2003; Piot, 2001; Yeh 
& Woidtke, 2005;  Minguez-Vera-Martin Ugedo, 2007), we measure shareholders-creditors’ agency 
costs by using the ratio of total debt per total assets. This should reflect the financial risk of the 
company  
 
3.2.6. Rate of earnings growth 
 
According to Kim & Sorensen, 1986, we adopt the rate of earnings growth as a measure of 
investment opportunities which can be defined as follows: E. Jedidi Hentati and F. Jilani/ Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
 
1777
OI: {Earnings (n) - Earnings (n-1)} / Earnings (n) 
3.2.7. The size of the company  
 
The academic literature proposed several measures for the size of the company: the logarithm of the 
book value of the assets of the company (Taylor & Baker, 1981; Firth, 1997), the market 
capitalization (Frankel et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003) and the natural 
logarithm of total turnover (Haskins and& Williams, 1988, Chan et al., 1993, Geiger & Rama, 2003). 
In our study, we choose to retain this last measurement. 
 
3.2.8. The Closing date 
 
We measure this variable by using a binary variable which takes the value 1 if the company closes its 
audited accounts in December and zero if the company closes its accounts at another date. A 
summary of these variables is presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1   
Summary of The variables  
Nature Code Definition measure Sign Source
Variable to explain :the non-audit fees
Ln_honornaudit Consulting fees Log (Consulting fees) annual 
Explanatory variables
Variables of 
interest
RAUD Membership  = 1 if the firm is audited  + annual 
COM AUDIT the existence of an Audit  = 1 if there Audit  - annual 
TDTA the debt ratio Total debts / total assets + Diane base
OI growth rate of earnings Earnings = {(n) - Earnings  + Diane base
Qt Performance of the  (market value / total  + Base 
Control variables
Taill the size of the firm Natural logarithm of total  + Diane base
Dec Closing of accounts = 1 if the company  + Diane base
 
3.3. The theoretical model 
To verify the validity of our hypothesis, we consider the following theoretical model: 
ln_honornait = α0 + α1 raudit +α2 comité-d-auditit +α3 tdtait +α4 oiit +α5taillit +α6 decit+α7 Qtit +εit 
where: 
ln_honornait : honorarium of “non-audit” of auditors, raudit : presence or not of BIG, comité-d-
auditit : presence or not of an audit committee, tdtait : debts, oiit : investment opportunities, taillit : 
size of the audited firm, decit : closing accounts, Qtit : Tobin Q, Qtit : Tobin Q, Qtit : Tobin Q,  i :  
represents the firm, t : period of the study, α : coefficients associated to the independent variables 
and εit : error term. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Multicolinearity tests 
 
Firstly, we analyse the independence between the variables using the correlation coefficients given by 
the Spearman matrix. We retain the critical value of Kervin (0.8) as an indicator of the presence of a 
multicolinearity problem between variables. We observe that the variables : financial performance of 
the audited firm “Qt” and debts “tdta” are very correlated  with a correlation coefficient of 0,9984. 
Then, these variables must not be included simultaneously in the same multivariate model. 
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Table 2 
Spearman correlation matrix 
  qt raud  comité~t  tdta  oi taill  dec 
qt  1.0000             
raud -0.1853 
0.0113 
1.0000       
comité~t  -0.0129 
0.8616 
0.5578 
0.0000 
1.0000         
tdta 0.9984 
0.0000 
-0.1865 
 0.0108   
-0.0142 
 0.8472 
1.0000     
oi  0.1296 
0.0780 
0.0538 
0.4655 
0.0461 
0.5324 
0.1326 
0.0711 
1.0000     
taill 0.0096 
0.8962 
0.2482 
0.0006 
0.2181 
0.0028 
0.0206 
0.7805 
-0.0209    
0.7766 
1.0000  
dec  0.1002 
0.1736 
-0.0801 
0.2773    
-0.1435    
0.0506    
0.0937 
0.2036 
0.0476 
0.5184 
0.2050 
0.0050 
1.0000 
 
Then, we present VIFs and verify that the variables « Qt » and « tdta » present vifs higher than 3. 
According to Ding and Stolowy (2003), this signals the presence of a multicolinearity problem 
between these variables and confirms thus the conclusion given by the Spearman correlation matrix. 
 
Table 3 
VIFs of the independent variables 
Variable  qt raud  comité~t  tdta oi taill  dec  Mean 
VIF  505.60  504.25  1.56 1.55 1.52 1.13  1.02  145.23 
1/VIF  0.001978  0.001983  0.640965 0.643091 0.657112 0.887336  0.979221  
 
4.2. Results 
 
To analyse the relationship between the « honorarium of non audit » and the performance of the firm, 
we consider two models  to take into account the multicolinearity problem between the variables 
(“ Qt” et “ tdta”). These models can be written as follows: 
 
Model 1: 
ln_honornait = α0 + α1 raudit + α2 comité-d-auditit + α3 oiit + α4 taillit + α5decit + α6 Qtit + εit 
 
Model 2: 
ln_honornait = α0 + α1 raudit + α2 comité-d-auditit + α3 tdtait + α4 oiit + α5 taillit + α6 decit + εit 
 
where: 
ln_honornait , Qtit , raudit , comité-d-auditit , tdtait , oiit , taillit , decit , i , t , α and ε it are the same variables 
presented above. According to the Hausman test, our model is a fixed effect model. Then, we test the 
presence of heterosedasticity and autocorrelation problem.  
Table 4   
Specification tests  
 Chi2  (p-value)  Fisher (p-value)
Fisher test     F( 61,116) = 11.29     P-value = 0.0000  
Hausman test   Chi2(7) = 39.68       P-value = 0.0000    
Breush et Pagan test  chi2(1) =   133.59    P-value =   0.0000    
Wald Modified test  
 
chi2 (62) =19266.47 P-value =  0.0000   
  
Wooldridge test     F(  1,61) = 17.097    P-value = 0.0001  
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Based on the test of breusch and pagan, we support the presence of heterosedasticity problem 
between errors. Also, the test of wooldridge indicates that we cannot accept the nul hypothesis of the 
absence of autocorrelation between errors. The results of the different specification tests are 
summarized in the Table 4. The Table 5 below provides the results of the linear regression models. 
 
Table 5  
Linear regression of the determinant of non-audit fees 
  Model  1 Model  2 
Variables  SP with "non-audit" fees α i α’i 
Constant    -.442129  -.402536    
Raud    2.372865 ***  -1.111475 *** 
Comité d’audit    -1.117381 *** .0007691 *** 
TDTA    - .4663784 *** 
OI   .0014973  .0014802       
taill    .350956 ***  .3485958 ***  
dec   .4975759  .5029587  (0.169)
Qt    .4913372 ***  - 
Wald chi (2) = 3429.41*** ; R-Squared = 0.6319 
Wald chi (2) = 3344.08*** ; R-Squared = 0.6343 
Model 1: we eliminated the variable "tdta" 
Mode2: we eliminated the variable "Qt" 
Are shown in this table the coefficients of the linear estimation (α it) and the p-value on each of the variables included in the template. 
Are presented as the statistical test wald chi (2) 
*, ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
SP corresponds to the predicted signs 
As it appears from the table, the wald Chi-Square test shows a value of 3429.41 significant at 1% for 
Model 1 and 3344.08 significant at 1% for the model 2. The results show a high and significant value 
indicating that the model is significant. This allows us to reject the null hypothesis of nullity of all 
coefficients  α. Similarly, the value within, which gives an idea of the share of intra-individual 
variability of the variable "non-audit fee" explained by those variables, is 63.19% for Model 1 and 63, 
43% for model 2, which implies a good fit between the groups. Let's start with the membership of the 
auditor to an international network. The variable “raud” show a significant effect at 10% level on 
non-audit fees (which is positive for model 1 and negative for model 2). This is due to the self-
selection of the auditors. In fact, having at least one BIG 4 among the two co-auditors results in an 
increase in fees (premium BIG 4). 
  
For the Audit Committee variable, our results show that the presence of an audit committee has a 
significant effect at 10% level for the two models. For the model 1, we assume that the existence of a 
substitution between governance mechanisms limits the control effort made by external auditors, and 
therefore reduces audit fees. However, for the model 2, we assume the hypothesis of a 
complementarity between governance mechanisms. In this sense, an advanced external audit 
complements the work of an effective internal audit committee, which results in larger fees. 
The debt variable which measures the risk of bankruptcy is significant at the 1% level and indicates a 
positive effect on non-audit fees. This confirms our third hypothesis. According to Simunic (1980), 
the debt ratio exposes the auditor to financial and reputational risks. Hence, the auditor has to face 
these risks by offering consulting services. 
 
The Investment Opportunities variable is not significant. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is rejected.  
For the size variable, we report a positive and significant effect at the 1% level. It is mainly large 
companies that extend their fees to the achievement of the non- audit missions. Also, the closing date 
of the accounts explains positively and significantly the amount of paid fees. This result confirms our 
hypothesis that a date equal to December 31 allows auditors to propose higher non-audit fees because 
at this date firms’ resources are fully employed and therefore auditors require higher non-audit fees.   1780
Finally, the financial performance of the firm is positively correlated at the 1% level with not-audit 
fees. This result confirms our seventh hypothesis. This can be explained by the transfer of auditors’ 
responsibilities by performing non audit services other than audit services. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We tried to conduct a study of the determinants of non-audit fees, to test the hypothesis of a 
relationship between the financial performance of the audited company and the amount of non-audit 
fees. Our results reveal that the membership of the auditor to an international network, the presence 
of an audit committee, the debt, the size of the company and the closing date influences the amount of 
non audit fees. Also, we found that non-audit fees increase when the financial performance of the 
audited company improves. This is explained by the transfer of the auditors’ competences by 
performing non audit services other than audit services. However, investment opportunities do not 
affect the amount of non audit fees. 
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